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Revisiting European Unemployment:
Unemployment, Capital Accumulation, and
Factor Prices
01ivier Blanchard
Abstract
The paper starts from two sets of facts about Continental Europe. The
first is the steady increase in unemployment since the early 1970s. The
second is the evolution of the capital share, an initial decline in the 1970s,
followed by a much larger increase since the mid 1980s.
The paper then develops a model of capital accumulation, unemploy-
ment and factor prices. Using this model to look at the data, it reaches
two main conclusions:
The initial increase in unemployment, from the mid-1970s to the mid
1980s, was mostly due to a failure of wages to adjust to the slowdown in
underlying factor productivity growth. The initial effect was to decrease
profit rates and capital shares. Over time, the reaction of firms was to
reduce capital accumulation and move away from labour, leading to a steady
increase in unemployment, and a recovery of the capital share.
The reason why wage moderation, clearly evident in the data since the
mid-1980s, has not led to a decrease in unemployment is that another type
of shifts has been at work, this time on the labour demand side. At a given
wage and a given capital stock, firms have steadily decreased employment.
The effect of this adverse shift in labour demand has been to lead to both
continued high unemployment, and increasing capital shares.
What lies behind this shift in labour demand? There are two potential
lines of explanation. The first is shifts in the distribution of rents, away
from workers, for example the elimination of chronic excess employment
by firms. The second explanation points to technological bias: firms in
Continental Europe are introducing technologies biased against labour and
towards capital.
This paper is a rewritten and abridged version of ’~rhe Medium Run",
published in the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity [1997]. I thank
John Simon and Petya Koeva for their excellent research assistance.
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This paper was triggered by the juxtaposition of two sets of facts
about Continental Europe:
The first is the striking -- and by now familiar -- increase in
unemployment, and is shown in Figure 1. The figure traces
the behaviour of the unemployment rate in the three major
Continental European countries, France, Germany and Italy,
since 1970. Except for a small dip in the late 1980s, unemploy-
ment has steadily increased since the early 1970s, standing now
above 10 per cent in all three countries.
The second is less familiar but nearly equally striking, and
is presented in Figure 2. The figure traces the behaviour of
the share of capital in the business sector in the same three
countries, since 1970. Capital shares, which had decreased in
the 1970s, have increased steadily since, and stand now at their
highest level in recent history. In France for example, the share
of capital has increased from a low of 29 per cent of GDP in
1981 to a high of 40 per cent in 1995.
My initial intent was to focus on the behaviour of the capital
share. But it became quickly clear that thinking about the factors
behind the evolution of the share led to revisit the factors behind the
evolution of unemployment. Thus, the paper became an attempt at
explaining the joint behaviour of unemployment, capital accumula-
tion and factor prices. A sketch of the story that comes out is the
following:
The initial increase in unemployment, from the mid-1970s to the
mid-1980s, was mostly due to a failure of wages to adjust to the
slowdown in underlying factor productivity growth. The initial ef-
fect was to decrease profit rates and capital shares. Over time, the
reaction of firms was to reduce capital accumulation and move away
from labour, leading to a steady increase in unemployment, and a
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recovery of the capital share. That part of the story, which was al-
ready largely told by Bruno and Sachs [1985] in the mid-1980s, is
familiar, and in its broad outlines, not controversial. It is the second
part of the story which is new, and is likely to be more controversial.
Since the mid-1980s, wages have substantially decreased relative
to underlying factor productivity. The reason why this wage mod-
eration has not led to a decrease in unemployment is that another
type of shifts appears to have been at work, this time on the labour
demand side. At a given wage and a given capital stock, firms have
steadily decreased employment. The effect of this adverse shift in
labour demand has been to lead to both continued high unemploy-
ment, and increasing capital shares.
What lies behind this shift in labour demand? The paper does
not answer that question. But, as a matter of logic, there are two
potential lines of explanation. The first points to shifts in the dis-
tribution of rents: an explanation along these lines is for example
that, over the last ten to fifteen years, firms have steadily reduced
the chronic excess employment from which they suffered earlier in
time. The second explanation points to technological bias: firms
in Continental Europe have introduced technologies biased against
labour and towards capital. Both interpretations carry however the
same implication for the future. While the initial increase in profit
rates has come so far with higher unemployment, the future should
be brighter. As high profit rates trigger higher capital accumulation,
employment should increase, and unemployment should decrease in
the future.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections I and II, I develop
a simple model of unemployment and capital accumulation and use
it to introduce three types of shifts -- labour supply, labour demand
and user cost shifts -- and to describe their dynamic effects on the
economy. In Sections III and IV, I turn to the’ data, focusing on one
country, namely France. I construct time series for each of the three
shifts, and show how, together, they can account for both the evolu-
tion of unemployment and the other major macroeconomic variables,
including the capital share. I then briefly describe results when the
same methodology is used for other countries. In Section V, I list
both tentative conclusions and a long list of open questions.
I. Labour Demand and Labour Supply
My purpose in this section is to introduce the simplest model
of employment, unemployment and capital accumulation that will
do the job, i.e. give a structure transparent enough to organize the
discussion, yet rich enough to be taken to the data later on.
As a result of this choice, some shifts are taken as primitive,
whereas they Would be derived from deeper assumptions in a more
theoretically ambitious model. In this sense, this paper is comple-
mentary to -- but more modest than -- two recent and related stud-
ies, the first by Phelps [1994] and the second by Caballero and Ham-
mour [1997]. Both of these studies can be seen as trying to identify
the potential factors behind the shifts I take as primitive. In con-
trast to those studies, this paper must be seen instead primarily as
an exercise in organized data description.
The presentation of the model in the text is informal. A formal
model, used bofh for simulations in the next section, and to construct
and simulate the effects of the various shifts later, is presented in the
appendix.
Short- and Long-run Labour Demand
Assume that production is characterized by a constant returns to
scale production function, and Harrod-neutral technological progress:
y = f(k, an) (1)
y is output, k is capital, n is labour, a is an index of the level
of technology, and technological progress is assumed to be labour
augmenting, so that a multiplies n. an is often called "labour in effi-
ciency units." As is well known from growth theory, the assumption
of Harrod-neutral technological progress is the only one that delivers
balanced growth. Thus, it is a natural benchmark assumption here.
At any point of time, capital is given, and firms decide how much
labour to employ. Ignoring for the moment costs of adjusting factor
proportions -- which I shall introduce below -- assume that employ-
ment is given by:
a fn(k, an) = (1 -F #)w
This extends the standard first-order condition that marginal prod-
uct equals the wage by allowing for a wedge between the two, param-
eterised by #. Non-zero values of # may come from imperfections in
the goods and/or the labour market. For example, monopoly power
in the goods market leads to positive values of # (which, in this case,
has the interpretation of a markup of price over marginal cost).1 Or,
taking an example from the labour market, featherbedding -- firms
being forced by unions to employ more workers than they would want
at a given wage -- will lead to negative values of #: the product of
the marginal worker will be lower than his wage.2 In this paper, I
shall take shifts in # as primitives, leaving identification of the factors
behind the estimated shifts below to future research.
Denote the ratio of labour in efficiency units to capital, (an/k)
by x. The first order condition can be rewritten as:
fn(1, x) = (1 +#)w (2)
a
Given that fun < 0, the ratio of labour in efficiency units to capital,
x, is a decreasing function of the wage in efficiency units, (w/a).
Solving for x gives:
x----x((1H-~)w), x’<0 (3)
1The analysis of goods markets in Phelps [1994] is aimed at explaining what
factors may lead to changes in the markup, and through this channel, to changes
in equilibrium unemployment.
2This is indeed the outcome in so-called "efficient bargaining" models. In
these models, the marginal product of labour is set to the reservation wage of
the worker/But the wage is a weighted average of the marginal and the average
product of labour.
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And employment, n, itself is given by:
k
x’n = - x((1 +# , < 0 (4)
a
This short-run labour demand relation is drawn as DD in Figure
3, for a givenvalue of (k/a). Employment, n, is measured on the
horizontal axis, the wage in efficiency units, (w/a) on the vertical
axis.
To this basic set-up, I add two sources of dynamics, which both
capture important aspects of the data.
The first is costs of adjusting factor proportions. The produc-
tion function (1) is best thought as representing the set of ex-ante
substitution possibilities. Once firms have chosen specific machines,
the scope for substitution is more limited. The most appealing way
of formalizing this is through the explicit introduction of putty-clay
technology (with positive elasticity of substitution only for new ma-
chines). A less conceptually appealing, but analytically Simpler way,
is to assume convex costs of changing factor proportions x. This is
what I do here; This implies a vertical/n~antaneous labour demand,
which, for a given capital stock, converges over time to equation (4)
rotates counterclockwise to converge to DD in Figure 3. Given
this assumption, exogenous changes in wages lead initially to move-
ments in the labour share in the same direction, independently of
the elasticity of substitution in the production function (1).
The second is costs of adjusting the capital stock. A high profit
rate triggers capital accumulation, a low profit rate to trigger decu-
mulation. This takes place until the profit rate is equal to the user
cost of capital. To derive the implications Of this long-run condition,
note first that the ,profit rate, i.e. profit per unit of capital, is given
by:
¯
 =lO, x)"
Replacing x by its value from equation (3), we can express the profit
rate as a function of w/a. For short, we can write:
= , < 0 (5)
For # = O, this is simply the "factor price frontier", which says that
the profit rate is inversely related to the wage in efficiency units.
Assume that the price of capital in terms of goods is equal to I,
that the depreciation rate is equal to ~ and the interest rate equal to
r. Then, in the long-run, it must be that:
I/)
= r + (6)
For a given r, the free entry condition pins down the wage (in ef-
ficiency units) in the long-run. If the wage is higher, then there is
steady capital decumulation, and by implication, a steady decrease
in employment; if lower, steady capital accumulation, and a steady
increase in employment. In other words, the long-run labour demand
is horizontal. It is drawn as the horizontal line in Figure 3.
A property that will prove useful below is that, around/% = 0,
small changes in/t have no effect on the profit rate.3 By implication,
they have no effect on the wage consistent with zero net profit in the
long-run, thus on the position of long-run demand.
Labour Supply
Think of "labour supply" as the relation between the wage set in
bargaining between firms and workers, and labour market conditions.4
More specifically, let, for notational convenience, the labour force
be equal to one, so that n stands for the employment rate, and for
one minus the unemployment rate. Assume that labour supply is
given by:
---=g(n,z), gn>O, gz >0 (7)
a
The wage (in efficiency units) is an increasing function of the employ-
ment rate (equivalently, a decreasing function of the unemployment
rate), and of other factors, summarized in the variable z.
SThis follows from the fact that 7r depends on/~ only through its effect on x,
and that, evaluated at/~ ---- 0, d~r/dx ~- O.
4Some readers may object to the semantics here, and prefer to call this relation
the wage relation, or the wage-setting relation, of the supply wage relation. I find
the use of "labour supply" to be a convenient short-hand.
Figure 3.
employment unemployment
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Much recent research has focused on the derivation of such a re-
lation, and the many factors -- bargaining structure, unemployment
benefits, employment protection rules, and so on -- that hide behind
z.5 Just as for # earlier, I shall take shifts in z as primitives in this
paper, leaving to future research the task of linking the estimated
shifts below to underlying shocks and changes in institutions. Let
me however mention one point here. Note that, for given labour
market conditions, the wage, w, is assumed in (7) to move one for
one with the level of technology, a. Such a condition has to hold in
the long-run if the unemployment rate is to be invariant to the level
of technology. But it may not hold in the short run: if, for example,
the bargaining wage fails to adjust to a slowdown in tfp growth for
some time, .this will show up as a positive value of z during that
period of tinm. I shall return to this possibility below.
The labour supply relation is drawn as the upward sloping curve
SS in Figure 3: the higher the employment rate (equivalently, the
lower the unemployment rate), the higher the bargained wage.
The short-run and long-run labour demand and labour supply re-
lations are drawn in Figure 3 so that they all cross at the same point:
the economy is initially in the steady state associated with balanced
growth. Over time, wages grow in line with technological progress;
equivalently, wages in efficiency units are constant. Employment is
constant (the labour force is assumed constant here). The unem-
ployment rate, that we can measure starting from the right in the
figure, is also constant. Capital grows at the same rate as labour
in efficiency units, so that the ratio of labour in efficiency units to
capital is constant. Absent shifts, technological progress does not
affect unemployment.
5 Much of the focus of Caballero and Hammour [ 1997] is precisely on the explicit
derivation of this relation from bargaining between firms and workers, and on the
role of changes in labour market institutions in affecting the relation between
wages and labour market conditions.
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II. Dynamic Effects of Labour Supply, Labour Demand,
and User Cost Shifts
This section describes the dynamic effects of various shifts on the
economy. The informal discussion is supplemented by simulations
using the model developed and calibrated in the appendix. While
a full description of the model and a discussion of the choice of the
parameters is left to the appendix, it is useful to list the main features
of the simulation model here:
¯ Production is characterized by a CES function, given by:
o"--1 o*--1 a’~l
= -- ~)(an)7 +o~k--;-    )y A((1
The elasticity of substitution cr is assumed equal to either 1.0
or to 2.0. a is chosen so as to imply an initial share of capital
equal to 0.3. The depreciation rate is 10 per cent a year.
¯ The costs of adjusting factor proportions are chosen so as to
imply a mean lag of adjustment (in response to permanent
changes in factor prices) of about 5 years.
¯ The costs of adjusting capital imply a within-year elasticity of
investment with respect to the shadow price of capital of 1.0.
¯ The real interest rate is fixed at 5 per cent, and independent
of the demand for capital.
¯ The bargained wage is given by the relation log(w/a) = -flu +
z. The parameter flis taken to be equal to 1: an increase in the
unemployment rate of a percentage point leads to a decrease
in the wage of 1 per cent.
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Labour Supply Shifts
Consider first an adverse labour supply shift, an increase in z.
The reason may be a change in labour market institutions
, 
such as
an increase in the generosity of the unemployment benefits system.
Or, as we discussed above, it may reflect a failure of wages to adjust
to a slowdown in productivity growth: because we measure the wage
in efficiency units on the vertical axis, such a failure of wages to
adjust leads to an increase in the wage w relative to a, and thus an
increase in (w/a), at a given unemployment rate.
The dynamics of adjustment are depicted in Figure 4. The initial
effect of the adverse labour supply shift is to shift the labour supply
relation from SS to S~St, up along the vertical instantaneous labour
demand curve. Thus, the economy moves from point A to point B.
There is no adjustment of quantities yet, and the increase in wages
is reflected in a corresponding decrease in the profit rate and the
capital share. This in turn triggers two dynamic responses:
Over time, firms adjust factor proportions, shifting away from
labour, moving towards a lower labour-capital ratio. For a given
capital stock, the labour demand curve tilts to converge to DD.
This leads to both a decrease in employment and a partial recovery
of the profit rate. If the elasticity of substitution is greater than one,
this leads to a more than full recovery of the capital share.
Over time also, lower profit triggers capital decumulation, and
thus a shift of the demand curve to the left, leading to both a decrease
in employment and, through the effect of unemployment on wages,
a decrease in wages. The decrease in wages also leads to a recovery
of the profit rate and of the capital share.
Thus, both lower capital and a lower labour-capital ratio lea_d over
time to lower employment, higher unemployment and a decrease in
the wage: the effect of the initial wage push on the wage is steadily
offset by the effect of higher unemployment. In the long-run, with an
unchanged user cost, the profit rate must return to its initial value.
This implies that the wage must return to its initial value as well.
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The economy ends up at point C.
In the new steady state, unemployment is higher: this higher
unemployment rate is needed to offset the effects of the increase in
z on the wage. But the labour-capital ratio, the profit rate and
the wage rate are the same as before the shift, and so is the share
of capital. The economy is basically operating in the same way as
before, only at a lower level of activity for both labour and capital.
Figure 5 presents the results of the corresponding simulation. The
shift is a permanent, unexpected, increase in z in year 5, from 0.0
to 0.1. The model is solved under rational expectations. The figure
plots the evolution of the profit rate, the wage rate, the profit-wage
ratio, the labour-capital ratio, the capital share and the unemploy-
ment rate, for two values of a, 1.0 (continuous line) and 2.0 (dotted
line). Both the wage and labour are measured in efficiency units.6
The figure shows the decline and the recovery of the profit rate
and the capital share, together with the steady increase in the un-
employment rate. It also shows how the labour-capital ratio initially
goes down as wages are high, but then recovers as wages are forced
down by higher unemployment.
The figure also allows us to examine an explanation that has been
offered for the increase in capital shares since the early 1980s, namely
that~ they may reflect the dynamic response to the earlier adverse
wage shifts of the 1970s. This is indeed a logical possibility: if the
elasticity of substitution is greater than one, then the initial decrease
in the capital share following an increase in the wage will turn into
an increase in the capital share as firms adjust factor proportions
to reflect the underlying substitution possibilities. (In the long run,
as the wage returns to its initial value, the share will also return
to its initial value, whatever the elasticity of substitution. But this
may take a long time.) At least for the parameters used for the
6Let me use the opportunity to correct a mistake in Blanchard [1997]. Figure
4 in that paper is the same as Figure 5 here, but incorrectly states the time unit
as being a quarter, when it is in fact a year. The same remark applies to Figures
5 and 6 in that paper.
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simulations, this hypothesis appears unlikely to play an important
role empirically. The path of the capital share for a ---- 2 shows
indeed the share exceeding for some time its steady state value; but
the path is barely distinguishable from the path corresponding to the
case where ~ ---- 1, and the degree of overshooting is small.7
Even at this crude stage of the analysis, it is clear that adverse
labour supply shifts can potentially explain much of the early evo-
lution of European unemployment from the mid-1970s on. They
naturally explain why the share of capital first went down and then
recovered, while unemployment kept increasing. But it is also clear
that they do not naturally explain what happened after the mid-
1980s, namely the increase in the share much above its 1970 level.
This motivates looking at other shifts.
Labour Demand Shifts
Define an adverse labour demand shift as a decrease in x given
(w/a) in equation (2), or equivalently a decrease in employment given
(w/a), k and a in equation (4). This shift may have one of two causes:
(i) It may’come from an increase in the wedge between the
marginal product and the wage, #. I find the following example
useful to think about, and probably relevant to the European ex-
perience. Suppose that firms had chronic excess employment, and
are now willing and able to eliminate it. Why might this be? Per-
haps because tighter corporate governance forces them to, perhaps
because the unions are weaker and unable to enforce featherbedding.
In terms of our model, this will lead to an increase in # from an
initially negative value to a value equal to zero.
(ii) The shift may come instead of a non Harrod-neutral shift in
technology, leading firms to want to shift from labour to capital at a
7The assumption which plays an important role here is the assumption that
the interest rate is given. If we were to assume instead an upward sloping supply
of capital, an increase in z would lead to a higher wage in steady state, and, if the
elasticity of substitution was greater than 1.0, an increase in the capital share in
the long run. This points to the issue of the elasticity of capital supply both for
an individual European country, and for Europe as a whole.
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given wage in efficiency units.
To make things more concrete, think of firms as having a Cobb-
Douglas production function:
y = ka(an)1-a
And think of an increase in a, the coefficient on capital,s For given
values of k, n and a, and thus a given value of x = an~k, the marginal
product of labour will decrease (correspondingly, the marginal prod-
uct of capital will increase); conversely, at a given wage, employment
will decrease.
Assume first that the labour demand shift is due to an increase
in the wedge/~, and for concreteness, think of it as coming from a
reduction in featherbedding. The dynamic effects of such a shift are
characterized in Figure 6.
For a given capital stock, and a given wage, firms want to reduce
employment. Thus, the labour demand relation shifts to the left,
from, say, DD to DtD(. Because of costs of adjusting factor pro-
portions, this decrease in employment takes place only over time.9
Thus, the economy moves dow:a from point A along the labour supply
relation, and unemployment increases.
This reduction of employment triggers in turn two further adjust-
ments, and both work to turn the initial increase in unemployment
around. First, the elimination of excess employment increases the
SA while back, Houthakker [1956] showed how one could think of the Cobb-
Douglas production function as the result of aggregation of Leontief functions,
with the coefficients of the underlying functions being jointly Pareto-distributed.
The same justification can be given here. New technologies are introduced that
lead to a larger proportion of relatively caDltal-intensive methods of production,
and thus, to an increase in the coefficient on capital in the aggregate production
function.
9One may question the assumption that changing factor proportions is costly,
whatever the cause. One may argue for example that removing featherbedding
can be done much t~ster than changing factor proportions in general. Changing
this assumption would change the dynamics, but not the qualitative implications
emphasized below.
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Figure 6. Effects of an adverse labour demand shift
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profit rate and the capital share. The increase in the profit rate in
turn leads to capital accumulation, and thus to an associated in-
crease in employment over time. Second, the increase in unemploy-
ment leads to a decrease in wages, and this decrease leads firms both
to increase their labour-capital ratio, as well as to increase capital.
Both of these effects lead also to more employment, and thus to an
eventual decrease in unemployment.
Thus, after increasing initially, unemployment eventually turns
around and starts decreasing. Where does the process end? We
know from the previous sectionthat, if we start close to # = O, then,
to a first approximation, the wage associated with zero net profit is
unaffected by changes in #. Thus, to a first approximation, the wage
goes back to its pre-shift level, and the economy returns to point A.
What happens at A is that while the labour-capital ratio is lower, the
stock of capital is higher, leading to the same level of employment
as before the shift. Given that the wage and the profit rate are the
same as before, but the labour-capital ratio is smaller, the capital
share ends up higher than it was before the shift.
Figure 7 shows the results of the corresponding simulation, in
which # increases unexpectedly and permanently by 0.1 in year 5,
again for two values of the elasticity of substitution, 1.0 and 2.0.
The figure shows how such an adverse labour demand shift leads
initially to both an increase in the unemployment rate and in the
share of capital. It also shows how unemployment turns around and
eventually returns to normal. The turnaround takes place however
only eight years after the initial shift, and unemployment declines
only slowly thereafter.
Figures 6 and 7 have shown the effect of an increase in the wedge,
/z, on the economy. What if instead labour demand shifts come
from bias technological change? The answer is that it makes very
little difference. Firms initially move away from labour, leading to a
decrease in employment. But over time, a higher marginal product
of capital and a lower wage lead to capital accumulation, and an
eventual increase in employment. The simulation results of a bias in
2O
Figure 7. Effects of an Adverse Labour Demand Shift
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technology -- parameterised by a change in the coefficients on capital
and labour in the CES production function, decreasing the marginal
product of labour relative to the marginal product of capital at a
given labour-capital ratio -- are nearly identicaI to those in Figure
7.
In summary, adverse labour demand shifts lead initially to an in-
crease in unemployment and an increase in the capital share. Even-
tually, unemployment turns around, while the capital share remains
permanently higher. This description suggests two tentative conclu-
sions. Adverse labour demand shifts appear to be good candidates
for the joint increase in unemployment and capital shares that has
characterized Continental Europe since the mid-1980s. And, if this
is right, they suggest a brighter future, where the initial period of
labour shedding may eventually be replaced by capital accumulation
and employment growth.
Shifts in User Cost
The third shift I look at is an increase in the user cost (r + ~),
coming from an increase in the interest rate.
This is done in Figure 8, and simulation results corresponding to
an increase in the interest rate of 2 percentage points are shown in
Figure 9. An increase in the user cost requires that firms eventually
achieve a similar increase in the profit rate. This in turn requires a
decrease in the wage associated with the zero net profit condition, a
downward shift of the long-run demand relation.
Therefore the economy moves from point A to point B along the
labour supply relation: employment decreases, and so does the real
wage. Two sources of dynamics are at work behind the decrease in
employment. First, the fact that the profit rate is now lower than
the user cost leads to a decrease in capitaI over time. Second, and
working in the opposite direction, the wage decline leads firms to
increase their labour-capital ratio. The net effect is however unam-
biguously to increase unemployment (otherwise the wage would not
decline in the first place). In the new steady state, at point B, the
22
Figure 8. Effects of an increase in user cost
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Figuro 9. Effects of an Inca’eas¢ in User Cost
o!
J
"x
0
j//
! -
t.i
!
!
¯ . ¯      I     lz     IQ     ~     34     ~a
24
wage is now such that the profit rate is equal to the higher user cost.
This is achieved through higher unemployment. Capital is lower, the
labour-capital ratio higher.
Thus, a higher user cost leads to higher unemployment. Its ef-
fects on the capital share are however ambiguous, and depend on the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in the under-
lying production function (1) (costs of adjusting factor proportions
are, to a first approximation, irrelevant for the issue at hand). If
the elasticity is equal to or larger than one -- as most estimates of
the long-run elasticity of substitution suggest -- then the share of
capital is lower in the new steady state (note that while the share
appears to move a lot in Figure 9, the range of values on the vertical
axis for the share is narrow. For a = 1, the share moves by less than
one percentage point). The simple point is that, while high interest
rates surely explain part of the high European unemployment, they
do not offer a natural explanation for the increase in capital shares
since the mid-1980s.
III. Constructing the Shifts. The Case of France
How can we assess the role of these three shifts in the rise of
European unemployment? One simple strategy is to construct them,
using the relations of the model presented above, and then carry out
a simulation of the model. This is what I do in this and the next
section. Three remarks are in order before I start:
(i) I focus on one country, France. I do so partly because the
evolution of both unemployment and the capital share are particu-
larly striking, partly because this is a country I. know well. But I
have carried out the same exercise for 14 OECD countries (see Blan-
chard [1997]), and I summarize the results at the end of this section.
Data for France and other countries correspond to the business sec-
tor only, and come from the OECD business sector data base, with
minor adjustments described in Blanchard [1997].
(ii) I ignore potential deviations of actual unemployment from
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equilibrium unemployment, coming from the interactions of shifts in
aggregate demand and nominal rigidities. This is not because I be-
lieve that these are not relevant, but because, like Phelps [1994], I
want to focus on the factors that affect equilibrium unemployment.
This choice however carries a number of costs. The constructed se-
ries for total factor productivity below reflect in part variations due
to cyclical variations, not true technological change (an issue famil-
iar from the Real Business Cycle literature). Movements in unem-
ployment due to deficient aggregate demand may be incorrectly at-
tributed to labour supply or labour demand shifts.I° I plead guilty,
hoping only that, for the medium run evolutions I want to focus on,
these issues are less important than for the analysis of year-to-year
fluctuations.11
(i!i) Constructing shifts is not as convincing as estimating them.
But estimating them is much harder... Constructing them for alter-
native values of the parameters appears to be a useful first step.12
Constructing Labour Supply Shifts
To construct labour supply shifts, I start from the wage relation
above:
Zoa( ) = + z
~ mb
t°If for example a decrease in aggregate demand decreases employment leaving
the wage unchanged, this will show up both as a combination of an adverse labour
supply shift -- the same wage at a higher unemployment rate -- and an adverse
labour demand shift -- less employment, given capital and the wage.
l ~ Both the measurement of tfp and of shifts could be improved to reduce these
problerus. Tfp could be measured better by taking into account the evolution of
hours per worker, of capacity utilization. An attempt could be made at construct-
ing an equilibrium unemployment series by using information about the change
in inflation. I have not explored these adjustments at this point.
12In Blanchard [1997], I take the second step of estimating the shifts in labour
demand by using time effects in a panel regression of 8 Continental European
countries of the labour-capital ratio on a distributed lag of the wage in efficiency
units. The implied shifts for France, obtained as the sum of the time effects
plus the country-specific residuals for France, turn out to be very close to those
constructed below using the benchmark parameters. This is obviously good news.
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The first step is to construct a measure for a, the level of tech-
nology. To do so, I construct the Solow residual for each year, using
the actual shares of labour and capital. I then divide it by the share
of labour to obtain the corresponding rate of change of efficiency
units. I then integrate this series over time and take the exponential
to get the level of a.13 I construct the real wage w by dividing the
cost of labour per worker (wage, fringe benefits, and labour taxes per
worker) by the business GDP deflator. To get (w/a), I then divide
the real wage by the constructed series for a.
I choose a benchmark value of fl equal to 1.0. For an unemploy-
ment rate of 10 per cent, this corresponds to an elasticity of the wage
with respect to unemployment equal to 0.1, roughly the number es-
timated by Blanchflower and Oswald [1994] in their estimation of a
"wage curve" for a number of countries. My work with Katz [1997]
has led me to conclude that the right number may be higher. Thus,
I also construct the series for z for/3 = 2.0, and for symmetry, also
for/3= 0.5.
Figure 10 shows the resulting series for z, with z constructed as
z =~ log(w/a) q-/3u, for each of the three values of/3. In each case,
the series is normalized to equal zero in 1970. It is only the change
since 1970, not the level which is relevant here.
All three series show a large increase in the early 1970s, with the
wage increasing much faster than measured total factor productivity,
a peak in the early 1980s, and a decline since then. Depending on the
value of/3, the value of labour supply shifts stands in 1996 between
1 per cent and 15 per cent. Put another way, wages in efficiency
units are actually lower today in France than they were in 1970
(by about 6 per cent); but they would probably become too high
13As Hall [1990] has reminded us, the derivation of the Solow residual is correct
only if the wedge between marginal product and the wage is equal to zero. If this
wedge is different from zero, the computation must be modified to take account
of the effect of the wedge on the shares. The results reported here are derived
under the assumption that the wedge during the period was equal to one. I have
also carried out the same exercise under the assumption that the wedge /z was
equal to 0.2; the results are very similar.
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if unemployment~ decreased, putting upward pressure on wages. How
high is "too high’! depends on the assumed value of 13, the effect of
unemployment on the wage.
Constructing Labour Demand Shifts
In constructing labour demand shifts, I take them to be shifts in
#, the wedge between the marginal product and the wage; as will be
clear below, if I were to interpret them as coming from technological
: bias, the constructed series would be identical, and as we discussed in
the previous section, the simulation results would be nearly identical
as well .....
As we saw earlier, ignoring dosts of adjusting the labour-capital
ratio, the marginal product of labour is equal to the wage times one
plus the wedge. Assuming that the production function is CES with
elasticity of substitution a, this relation takes the form:
log(W) +iog(l +#) = (ct +log(l- a)) - (i/~) log(~) (8)
where, because it will be useful below, the constant term on the right
is decomposed in a term in a (the parameter in front of capital in
the CES production function), and another term that depends on
the parameters on the production function, but not on a.
Using this equation, given the time series for (w/a) and (an~y),
and given a value for ~, one can construct a series for log(1 +#t), up
to a constant term:14
anlog(1 + ,t) = -log(=)t - log (T)
This equation is correct however only in the absence of costs of
adjusting factor proportions.15 If it is costly for firms to adjust those
14Note that under the additional assumption that a = 1.0, the change in the log
wedge is equal to minus the change in the log of the share of labour, a convenient
fact for back-of-the-envelope computations. For example, a decrease in the labour
share from 0.7 to 0.6 implies an increase in the wedge of roughly 15 per cent.
lSFor a detailed discussion of this and other issues of construction of the
markup, see Rotemberg and Woodford [1998].
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proportions, an increase in the wage WiU be associated with little
contemporaneous change in (an~k), and thus little change in (an~y);
this in turn will lead to a decrease in the measured wedge. As I show
in Figure lla below, this is indeed what happens when the series
for the wedge constructed using equation (8): the constructed series
for: the wedge turns out to be highly negatively correlated with the
labour supply shifts constructed earlier and shown in Figure 10.
" To take account of the dependence of factor proportions on the
history of wages rather than just the current wage, I replace the cur-
rent wage in equation (8) by a distributed lag of current and lagged
wages. A more ambitions approach would have been to try to ac-
count for both past and expected future values of the wage, to use the
first order conditi0nfor the firm relating factor proportions to both
past and expected future factor proportions and to the current wage.
I have decided to take this simpler and more transparent approach
here. M0re specifically, I construct the time series for log(1 q- #t) (up
to a constant) as:
lo’g(’J::q- #t) -= -- log(~t) -- (l/a) log (an)      (9)
Y t
where
log~t = A log~t-1 + (1 -- A) log (w)t
In line with the parameters chosen for the model earlier, I choose
benchmark values of a equal to 1.0 and a value of A equal to 0.8,
implying a mean lag in the adjustment of factor proportions to the
wage of 4 years.
As an increase in/z corresponds to a decrease in employment for
given k, a and w, I define a labour demand shift as the negative of
the constructed series for #.
The three series in Figure 11a correspond to three different val-
ues for A, 0.0 (correspondingto no costs of adjustment), 0.8 (the
benchmark value) and 0.9; in all three cases, cr is set equal to one.
The three series are normalized to be equal to 0 in 1970. Under the
3O
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assumption of zero costs of adjustment, labour demand shifts are
large and positive from the mid-1970s on, turning negative in the
late 1980s. But, as the other two graphs show, the initial increase
is largely spurious, coming from the slow adjustment of firms away
from labour in the face of the wage push. For A ---- 0.8, labour de-
mand shifts are positive but small from the late 1970s on, and’then
tltrn negative from the late 1980s on. For )~ = 0.9, they are basically
equal to zero until they turn negative from 1990 on. Note that in all
three cases, labour demand shiftS are large and negative at the end;
only the timing of the increase is affected by the value of A.
The graphs in Figure llb correspond instead to two different
values of a, 1.0 (the benchmark value) and 2.0; in both cases, )~
is set equal to 0.8. The higher value of a yields a more pronounced
increase in the 1980s, and a smaller decrease at the end of the period.
These series for labour demand shifts have been’derived under
the assumption that they reflected shifts in the wedge, and that
the production function was time invariant (up to Harrod neutral
technological progress), so that, in particular log(1 -a) was constant
in equation (8). But the ’Wedge shifts" could equally have been
called "technological bias shifts", changes in the coefficient ~, with
# remaining constant. Equation (8) makes clear that, just looking
at labour demand, changes in log(1 + #) and changes in - log(1 - ~)
are observationally equivalent. Thus, we could equally describe the
series in Figure 11 as showing technological bias in favour of capital
and against labour -- an increase in ~ -- since some time in the
mid-1980s.
Constructing User Cost Shifts
The user cost of capital in the model is given by r+~. To construct
the time series for r + ~, I use the depreciation ("scrapping") rate
from the OECD data for ~. I construct r in three different ways:
In the benchmark series I use for simulations below, I construct
r as equal to the long nominal interest rate on government bonds
minus the average rate of inflation over the previous five years. The
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resulting user cost series is denoted by "ucb5" in Figure 12. I also
plot two alternative series in Figure 12. The first uses the nominal
interest rate minus the inflation rate over the previous year, and is
denoted by "ucbl". The second constructs the required rate of return
as a weighted average of the real interest rate on bonds, constructed
as the nominal interest rate minus a five-year average of inflation,
and the required rate of return on equity, constructed as the sum
of the dividend-price ratio plus a five-year average of past output
growth (taken as an admittedly rough proxy for the expected rate of
growth of dividends). The weights are 0.7 on bond finance, and 0.3
on equity finance. This third series is denoted by "ucbe" in Figure
12.
All three series in Figure 12 show a low user cost in the 1970s, a
peak associated with disinflation in the early 1980s and another peak
associated with German reunification and the "Franc fort" policy in
the early 1990s. The user cost using lagged inflation rather than
a five-year average is higher during most of the 1980s, and a little
higher at the end. The user cost assuming bond and equity finance
shows little trend and ends up lower than the other two: this is
because the steady decrease in both the dividend-price ratio and the
growth rate over the last 15 years imply a steady decrease in the
estimated required rate of return on equity over the last 15 years.16
IV. Simulating the Model
Figure 13 shows the set of facts to be explained. It plots the
evolution of six series: the profit rate, the wage rate per efficiency
unit, the ratio of the profit rate to the wage rate (per efficiency unit),
the ratio of labour (again in efficiency units) to capital, the capital
a6In the computation of the user cost, I have ignored the trend decline in
the relative price of capital, which is absent from the model above but is surely
relevant empirically for a number of OECD countries. In France, this factor is
not very important. The relative price of investment goods has decreased by only
6 per cent since 1970.
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Figure 13. Facts to be Explained
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share and the unemployment rate, for France, from 1970 to 1996.
For ease of comparison with the simulations below, I normalize all
the variables to have 1970 values equal to that of the steady state of
the model; thus, in 1970, the profit rate is normalized to 0.15, the
wage rate to 0.35, the ratio of the profit rate to the wage rate to
0.428, the labour-capital ratio is equal to 1.0, the capital share to
0.30~ and the unemployment rate to 0.0. The basic evolutions are by
now familiar, in particular the increase in the capital share, and the
increase in unemployment.
All the simulations below assume zero values for the shifts pre-
1970, and actual values thereafter. They are run under rational
expectations, with expectations of future shifts at any point equal to
current values of these shifts. Each figure shows simulation results
raider two alternative assumptions about a, a = 1 (the hard line),
and ~ = 2, the dotted line.
Figure 14 shows the results of a first simulation allowing for shifts
in labour supply and in the cost of capital, but ignoring shifts in
labour demand (wedge or technological bias shifts). It shows how
the adverse labour supply shifts can explain the increase in unem-
ployment, and the increase in the capital share up to the mid-1980s.
But it shows how they are unable to explain the further rise in unem-
ployment as well as the further increase in the capital share since the
mid-1980s: as labour supply shifts decrease in magnitude, and lags
of adjustment in adjusting factor proportions work themselves out,
the labour-capital ratio turns around, leading to a counterfactual
reduction in unemployment and in the capital share.
Figure 15 shows the effects of all three shifts combined. It shows
how the adverse labour demand shifts since the early 1980s help ac-
count for the evolution of both unemployment and capital shares
since then. Compared to the previous simulation, the labour-capital
ratio keeps declining (as it does in the data) despite the fact that,
with the decrease in labour supply shifts and the downward pres-
sure from unemployment, the wage is now below its initial value.
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Unemployment remains high, and so does the capital shareF
Other Countries
In Blanchard [1997], I carried out a similar exercise for 13 other
OECD countries. The limits of mechanically carrying out such an
exercise are obvious. But the results were nevertheless revealing. I
would summarize them as follows.
There is a clear distinction between two groups of countries. In
a first group of countries, which I called "Anglo-Saxon countries"
(the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada), neither un-
employment nor the capital share show much in the way of trends.
And, especially for the United States, the constructed labour sup-
ply and labour demand shifts are small in amplitude throughout the
period.
In the other group of countries, which --- with a bit of geographic
licence -- I called Continental Europesal countries (Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Gm~nany, Ireland, Italy, Spain,
Sweden), unemployment has typically gone up, and the share typi-
cally shows the U-shape pattern we documented for France, low in
the early 1980s, and high today. In these countries, the period 1970-
1981 shows large adverse labour supply shifts. The period since then
is typically dominated by adverse labour demand shifts.
The simulation model is able to replicate the broad evolution of
unemployment in many but not all countries. As we discussed earlier,
when the fit is poor, this comes from the failure of the model to
l~The fit between actual evolutions in Figure 12 and simulated evolutions in
Figure 14 is obviously ~ry good. This is however largely by construction~ and
cannot be seen as a test of the model. Recall that the series for the labour supply
and demand shifts have been constructed so as to make the labour supply and
the labour demand relations fit exactly. If the model had no internal dynamics,
the fit would be perfect. To the extent that the model determines endogenously
the dynamics of capital accumulation and factor proportions, the fit can still turn
out to be poor. For France, the model fits the evolution of capital well, and thus
the overall fit is good.
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predict capital accumulation, and may thus come from an incorrect
construction of the user cost, or of marginal profit, or because of
the presence of shocks to’the investment function. It may also come
from our assumption that these economies were initially in steady
s~ate in 1970. In our model, an increase in the wage in efficiency
units necessarily leads to an increase in unemployment. But in an
economy which is catching up and not yet in steady state, an increase
in the wage in efficiency units is what we would expect to observe on
the adjustment path, and is consistent with constant unemployment.
Let me anticipate the question that you are likely to ask at this
point. What do the shifts look like for Ireland, and how well does the
model explain the evolution of unemployment and the capital share
since the early 1970s?
How the shifts look is shown in Figure 16, which plots the labour
supply, labour demand and user cost shifts since 1968 for Ireland,
constructed in the same way as those presented earlier for France,
under benchmark values for the parameters. Let me briefly fOCus on
the first two.
There is evidence of adverse labour supply shifts until the mid-
1980s, although less pronounced and taking place later than in France.
Since the mid-1980s however, there has been a dramatic turnaround.
The most likely explanation is the combination of the high rate of to-
tal factor productivity growth since then, together with wage growth
in line with wage growth in the United Kingdom m an implication
of the high degree of labour mobility between the two countries. The
timing and the amplitude of the decline in adjusted wages since 1985
suggests that this shift may well be the main factor behind the Irish
economic turnaround m more so for example than the often men-
tioned fiscal consolidation of the late 1980s.
As has been the case for France, the favourable effect of wage
moderation on employment has been partly dampened by adverse
shifts in labour demand. The evolution of labour demand shifts is
similar to that of France, but smoother. The magnitude of the shift
since the early 1980s is large, and similar to that of France. Again,
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this evolution may reflect technological change biased against labour
or the elimination of earlier chronic excess employment; whatever
the cause, this shift has led to less of a decrease in unemployment
and more of an increase in the capital share than would have been
the case otherwise.
How does the model do in replicating the evolutions of unemploy-
ment and the capital share? Recall that unemployment increased
from the late 1970s on to reach a peak of about 17 per cent in 1986,
and has decreased since. The capital share (in the business sector),
which -- except for two short-lived dips in 1975-76 and 1980-81 --
had remained around 20per cent until the early 1980s, has increased,
to reach 34 per cent today. The model accounts for the evolution of
the capital share very well. It predicts however more of a decrease
in unemployment since the mid-1980s than has been the case. The
reason is, I believe, the assumption in the model that the labour
force is fixed. In fact the increase in employment has triggered in-
mi~wation to Ireland; this in-migration has partly offset the effect of
higher employment on unemployment.
When used to forecast the future, the model yields optimistic con-
clusions. Favourable labour supply shifts, together with the favour-
able medium-run effects of adverse labour demand shifts lead to
steadily decreasing unemployment. The logic is straightforward. I
just hope the forecast is right...
V. Conclusions and Extensions
Let me briefly restate the main findings of the paper:
(i) Starting in the 1970s, most Continental European countries
were affected by large adverse labour supply shifts -- increases in
wages in excess of underlying productivity growth, at a given unem-
ployment rate. The initial effect of these shifts was to decrease profit
rates and capital shares. Over time, the reaction of firms was to move
away from labour, leading to a steady increase in unemployment and
a recovery of capital shares.
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(ii) Since the mid-1980s however, there has been substantial wage
moderation, and labour supply shifts have decreased relative to their
peak. But, since the mid-1980s also, they have been replaced by
adverse labour demand shifts -- decreases in employment by firms
given capital and wages. These shifts explain why unemployment has
remained high, and also explain the further rise in capital shares.
These findings have two obvious implications for the current de-
bate on European unemployment:
(i) The nearly exclusive focus on "labour market rigidities" may
be too narrow. If we think of labour market rigidities as leading to
too high a wage (or, more generally, too high a cost of labour) for
given labour market conditions, then, the conclusions above suggest
that they are only part of the story, especially so since the mid-
1980s.. Indeed, one potential interpretation of the adverse labour
demand shifts’I have identified in this paper is that firms have been
able to reduce chronic excess employment, either because of better
governance or because of weaker unions. In that sense, part of the
high unemployment rate may be due to the dismantling of some of
these labour market rigidities.
(ii) They yield a cautiously optimistic message about future Eu-
ropean unemployment. The logic of our model, and the results of
simulations, suggest that, while adverse demand shocks lead to more
unemployment initially, they lead to less unemployment later on.
To return to the example in the previous paragraph, the elimina-
tion of chronic excess employment initially increases unemployment.
But, by increasing profit, it leads to higher capital accumulation and
higher employment in the future. These positive effects are still to
come. But the logic of our argument suggests that, unless high user
costs prevent them from leading to more capital accumulation, they
may indeed be on the way.TM
1Sin that respect, a worrisome aspect of the current French economic situation is
that investment is low given current profit rates and sales: standard investment
ec[uations have shown large negative residuals for the past few years (INSEE
[1998]). This suggests that there may be something else at work, which is not
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The findings also raise a number of questions:
(i) The first comes from the sharp difference between Anglo-
Saxon countries -- especially the United States -- and Continental
countries. The proximate answer given by this paper for why the
United States has been able to avoid steadily rising unemployment
is that it had neither large adverse labour supply shifts early on, nor
large adverse labour demand shifts later on... (The share of capital
in the United States has remained nearly constant throughout the
period.) Such an answer is clearly just a first step. Is this absence of
measured supply and demand shifts due todifferent economic shocks
in the first place -- for example, a smaller decrease in total productiv-
ity growth in the 1970s -- or is it due to a different response to these
shocks, because of different labour market institutions? If adverse
labour demandshifts in Europe have come from technological bias,
why are firms in Continental Europe adopting different technologies
from those in the United States? This takes us to the second set of
questions: the sources of labour supply and labour demand shifts.
(ii) Identifying the source of the adverse labour supply shifts may
be the easiest part as it builds on a very large body of research. There
is ,a general consensus that the source of these shifts is to be found
in the interaction of economic events --the increase in oil prices
early on, the slowdown in total factor productivity growth, perhaps
a shift in the relative demand for skills more recently -- and labour
market institutions -- the social treatment of unemployment, em-
ployment protection, minimum wage legislation, and so on.19 One
¯ of the puzzles faced by previous research has been how to reconcile
the fact that unemployment has remained high while oil price hikes
have been more than reversed, workers’ aspirations must by now have
adapted to slower underlying productivity growth, unions appear to
have become weaker not stronger, governments have started tighten-
ing social insurance programmes, and so on. The findings that labour
supply shifts have indeed largely decreased, and that the persistence
captured in the model of this paper.
19For a useful survey, see for example NickeU [1997].
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of high unemployment comes from labour demand shifts since the
mid-1980s may offer a key to that puzzle.
Indeed, much of the econometric research on the increase in un-
employment has taken the form of estimation across countries and
time of a reduced-form equation for the unemployment rate as a
function of a number of observable variables. This paper suggests a
potentially more productive approach, that of identifying separately
supply and demand shifts, and then trying to explain each of them
separately.
(iii) Identifying the source of the more recent labour demand
shifts is more difficult. In Blanchard [1997], I carried out a test
based on a simple idea: if what has been at work is technological
bias, we should have seen changes in the production function; if
instead what has been at work is shifts in the distribution of rents,
we should see no such changes. I thus looked for whether I could
find shifts in the production function in the direction suggested by
the evolution of shares. That test unfortunately was inconclusive,
reflecting the general difficulty of precisely estimating production
functions, and even more so, changes in production functions over
time. The next step is, I believe, to look at cross-sectoral evidence,
and to try to relate demand shifts to potential underlying causes,
such as the estimated initial level of rents, the estimated initial degree
of labour hoarding, the initial structure of bargaining and so on.
There may also be something to be learned from the cross-country
evidence. Across the 14 countries I looked at, the cross-country cor-
relation between the labour supply shifts from 1970 to ,1.981 and the
labour demand shifts since 1981 is 0.40: countries which had larger
adverse labour supply shifts in the 1970s have typically also suffered
larger adverse demand shifts since. It is tempting to see this rela-
tion as causal. Firms in countries where labour supply shifts were
stronger may have decided to adopt technologies that used less labour
and more capital. The lags in introducing such technologies may be
even longer than those involved in changing factor proportions within
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the set of existing technologies.2°
This correlation between labour supply shifts and labour demand
shifts also suggests a tentative explanation for the difference between
Anglo-Saxon and Continental countries. The productivity growth
slowdown was smaller in Anglo-Saxon countries, induced technologi-
cal bias against labour has therefore been more limited. Put another
way, smaller adverse labour supply shifts in Anglo-Saxon countries
from 1970 to 1981 may explain why adverse labour demand shifts
have also been more limited.
(iv) The last question is that of the relation of the shifts between
labour and capital documented in this paper, and the shifts between
skilled and unskilled labour documented in recent research in labour
economics.
It is an intriguing fact that relative demand shifts between skilled
and unskilled workers appear to have been particularly strong in
Anglo-Saxon countries, and that relative demand shifts between lab-
our and capital appear to have been particularly strong in Conti-
nental Europe. One wonders whether there may be an integrated
explanation, whether what has happened in Anglo-Saxon countries
has been a shift from unskilled to skilled labour, whereas Continental
Europe has seen instead a shift from unskilled workers to capital.
Based on a preliminary look at numbers, it is not the case that
the increase in the capital share in Continental Europe since the early
1980s has come primarily at the expense of unskilled labour. The
data constructed by Laffargue and Saint-Martin [1997] for France
for example imply that the decrease in the labour share from 68 per
cent in 1982 to 58 per cent in 1990 has come from a reduction in
the share of unskilled workers (defined as blue collar workers plus
unskilled employees) from 10 per cent to 7 per cent, but also from a
reduction of the share of skilled workers from.58 per cent to 51 per
cent. In general, I interpret’the data from France and other coun-
2°A number of recent papers tell stories of endogenous bias in technology adop-
tion along broadly similar lines. See for example Zeira, [1997], and Acemoglu,
1199Tl.
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tries as suggesting two largely unrelated evolutions, a general and
steady shift away from unskilled labour everywhere, and in Conti-
nental Europe, a shift away from labour as a whole since the early
1980s. A useful extension to this paper may be to carry out a simi-
lar exercise, but keeping track of three factors of production, skilled
workers, unskilled workers, and capital.
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VI. Appendix
A. The Model
The economy is composed of monopolistically competitive firms; the
reason for introducing monopolistic competition is to explicitly derive the
wedge between the marginal product of labour and the wage, and to be able
to trace out the effects of changes in this Wedge on the macroeconomy.
Each firm uses one unit of capital, which it combines with variable
amounts of labour to produce output. The production function of a firm is
given by:
v = y(1, x)                   (i0)
Harrod neutral technological progress can be introduced straightforwardly;
all that is then needed is to m%~nre labour and wages in efficiency units.
I leave it out for notational s~mplicity.
The capital stock is thus equal to the number of firms in the economy,
and changes in the capital stock correspond to entry and exit decisions of
firms. Acontinuing firm makes only one decision at any point in time, that
of how much labour to employ. Note that x is both employment in a given
firm, and the labour-capital ratio for the economy as a whole.
Each firm is monopolistically competitive in the goods market. The
demand for its good.is given, in inverse form, by:
p = (y/~)-~ ;0 _< 7< 1
where pis the price charged by the firm relative to the price level, /7 is
average output, and 7 is the inverse of the elasticity of demand. It follows
from this constant elasticity specification that the gross markup of price
over marginal cost charged by a firm is equal to 1 +# with # ------ 7/(1 - 7).
Each firm faces costs of adjusting its labour-capital ratio --equivalently
its employment level. The cost of adjusting x to be given by (e/2) (dx/dt)9~,
where c is a parameter.
Each firm faces a constant probability of death, ~, faces real interest rate
r, and real wage (in terms of the price level) w. Under these assumptions
,
at any point in time, say time 0, the firm chooses employment so as to
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maximize its value, given by:
fo° - F~ (m +~)d~ ,v = e oo tTr~ -- (c/2) (dx,/dt)2) dt
where
7r=py--wx
The first order conditions, together with the symmetry condition that
all firms must charge the same price, so that p = 1, are then given by:
dx/dt = (lie) q
dqldt = (r + 5) q- ~rx
~r~ = (l/(l+/~))f,~(1,x)-w
Firms adjust the labour-capital ratio in response to the shadow price
q. The second equation defines q as the present value of marginal profit.
Marginal profit is equal to the marginal revenue product of labour -- itself
equal to the marginal product multiplied by the inverse of one plus the
markup -- minus the wage.
Once firms have adjusted the labour-capital ratio, the marginal product
of labour must be equal to the real wage times one plus the markup /1,
(equivalently, the marginal revenue product of labour must be equal to the
real wage). Denoting steady state values by a star, it follows from the
previous three equations that:
/~(1,x*) = (1 +/~) w* (11)
The evolution of the stock of capital comes from entry and exit of firrrLs.
To capture the slow adjustment of capital, I assume costs of adjustment for
capital: the relative price of capital is an increasing function of the net
rate of entry (equivalently, the net change in the capital stock). More
specifically:
Pk = 1 + h dk/dt (12)
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where h is a parameter. Free entry implieg that the following condition
must hold:
v -=Pk
If firlrLs could freely choose their initial factor proportions, the model would
yield a distribution of factor proportions acro~ firms, with proportions
depending on time of entry. To avoid such heterogeneity, I assume that
new firms enter with the same labour-capital ratio as existing firms. This
kt,~,ps the model tractable; but it also eliminates entry and exit of firms
as one of the channels through which aggregate factor proportions could
change over time.
The value of a new firm must be equal to the price of the machine
needed to run it. From the definition of v earlier:
~,ldt = (r + 6)v - (~ -- (cl2) (d~ldt)2)
Entry takes place -- equivalently the capital stock increases -- when the
vahm of an existing firm is greater than one. In steady state, dvldt =
dxldt = dkldt = 0 so that the previous equations imply;
= p (r + 6) = + 6) (13)
Profit per unit of capital is equal to the user cost.
This ends the description of the dynamic demands for capital and
labour. The aggregate demand for labour is given by n = kx, the labour-
capital ratio in each firm times the number of firms. I specify the supply
of factors as follows:
l assume the real wage to be given by:
log(w) = + (14)
where fl is the semi-elasticity of the wage with respect to the unemployment
rate, and z is the labour supply shift.
I a~ume r to be exogenous. This is a strong assumption: it implies that
the long-run supply curve of capital is infinitely elastic, and in combination
with equation (13) it implies that the profit rate always returns to the same
vahm (r + 6).
5O
B. Functional Forms and Parameters
I choose functional forms and parameters as follows. The model is
solved in continuous time but I think of the unit time period as a year and
define parameters below accordingly. I take the production function to be
CES, of the form (recall that each firm uses one unit of capital so that
capital is there but equal to one in the production function):
a-1
y = A ((1 - a)x--x- + a)~ (15)
I take the coefficient multiplying capital, c~, to be 0.3, the multiplicative
constant A----0.5. What happens to the capital share in the long-run in
response to an increase in wages depends on the elasticity ~. The evidence
in Blanchard [1997] and elsewhere points to a value of a close to 1.0; I
use 1.0 as the benchmark value. But to show how increases in wages can
potentially lead to an increase in the capital share, I also examine the case
where a is equal to 2.0.
I choose the probability of death for firms -- equivalently the depreci-
ation rate for capital -- 5, equal to 0.1, the real interest rate equal to 0.05.
I take the initial value of ~ to be equal to 0, corresponding to the case of
perfect competition; this implies a value for the markup,/t, of 1.0.
I choose a value for c equal to 4.0. In a world in which production was
strictly putty-clay, only the newly installed capital stock, thus roughly 10
per cent of the total capital stock each year, would embody the new desired
factor proportions. This would imply a mean lag of adjustment of 4.5 years.
Together with the other parameters of the model, a value of c of 4.0 implies
that firms close each year roughly 17 per cent of the gap between desired
and ~tual factor proportions. This in turn implies a mean lag of 4.8 years.
I choose a value for h equal to 10.0. This implies an elasticity of in-
vestment with respect to the relative price of capital, Pk, of 1.0. Empirical
evidence on the relation of investment to "Tobin’s Q" yields lower elas-
ticities, and thus higher implied values for h. But, as discussed in that
literature, these estimates are likely to be upward biased. The instrumen-
tal variable approach used by Cummins et al. [1994] yields an elasticity of~
about 0.7.
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l normalize the labour force to be equal to one. I choose z to be initially
equal to 0.35; this vahm implies zero unemployment in the initial steady
state. 1 choose a vahm of j~ equal to 1.0. For an average unemployment rate
of 10 per cent~ this corresponds to an elasticity of the wage with respect to
mmmployment equal to 0.1, roughly the number estimated by Blanchflower
and Oswald [1994] for a number of countries. The evidence in Blanchard
and Katz [1997] suggests that the elasticity is in fact lower in the short run,
higher ill the long run; ] ignore these dynamics here.
The parameters and their implications for steady state values of output
and other variables are given in Table 1. The model is solved using a
Fair-Taylor algorithm.
[Fable 1. Parameters and steady state values.
Parameters
a (elasticity of substitution) 1.0,2.0
a (coef on capital in prodn f.) 0.3
A (multiplicative ct in prodn f.) 0.5
g (depreciation rate) 0.1
It (markup) 0.0
r (interest rate) 0.05
c (cost of adjusting n) 4.0
It. (c~t of adjusting K) 10.0
fl (el~sticity of wage to N) 1.0
0 (wage at, zero unemp) 0.35
Steady state values
Output 0.50
Employment 1.00
Capital 1.00
Wage rate 0.35
Profit rate 0.15
Capital share 0.30
Unemployment 0.00
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